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Abstract
This paper explores new data on the transfer and renewal of U.S. patents and interprets
this new evidence using a theoretical model of patent transfers and renewal. We ﬁnd that
the proportion of transferred patents is large and diﬀers across technology ﬁelds and
especially types of patentees. We also ﬁnd that the probability of a patent being traded
depends on a number of factors—the age of the patent, the number of citations received
by a given age, the patent generality, and whether the patent has been previously traded
or not—. These ﬁndings are consistent with the predic t i o n so fam o d e lo fp a t e n tt r a n s f e r s
and renewal with gains from trade and costs of technology adoption.
1 Introduction
There is an extensive work in the empirical patent literature1; the main contribution of this
paper is that it makes use of data on the transfer of the ownership of patents. The United
States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce (USPTO) registers the transfer of patents in the form of
assignments, which acknowledge the transfer by a party of the rights, title and interest in a
patent or bundle of patents. As we show here, the market for patents is large. For instance,
13.5% of all granted patents are traded at least once over their life cycle and this rate is higher
when weighted by patent citations received. In our study, we make use of all these transferred
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paper. I acknowledge ﬁnancial support from the Bank of Spain Graduate Fellowship, the Federal Reserve Bank
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1There exists a very extensive empirical body of work in economics using patent data. Schmookler [44],
Scherer [45], Griliches [20], Pakes and Schankerman [37], Schankerman and Pakes [42], Pakes [36], Tratjenberg
[49], Jaﬀe, Henderson and Tratjenberg [25], Putnam [40], Lanjouw [30], Schankerman [43] Harhoﬀ,N a r i n ,
Scherer and Vopel [23], Lanjouw and Schankerman [31], Hall, Jaﬀe and Tratjenberg [22], etc.
1titles and link this information to the basic patent data that others have used (e.g., renewals,
patent citations received, generality, technology ﬁelds, patentees).2 The objective of this paper
is to describe the features of the new data set and present stylized facts that can provide both
new evidence about the diﬀusion of technology and guidance in the assessment of models of
intellectual property transfer.3
To understand the empirical regularities we present, we use a model of patent transfers
and renewal (Serrano [46]). The starting point of our theory is Pakes and Schankerman [37]
and Schankerman and Pakes [42]. They examine the problem of a patent owner deciding in
each time period whether or not to pay a renewal fee, and thereby extend the life of a patent,
in a context with heterogeneity in the economic value of inventions. The contribution of our
theory is to introduce the possibility of arrival of opportunities for surplus-enhancing transfer,
which may lead to alternative potential owners having greater valuation for a patent than the
current owner. But to transfer a patent to a new owner involves a cost of technology adoption
to be incurred by the buyer. Our model illustrates that the presence of both gains from trade
and costs of technology adoption not only determine the proportion of traded patents, but
also whether their characteristics diﬀer from the untraded ones. For instance, we ﬁnd that the
probability of patents being traded increases with gains from trade and patent revenue while
decreasing with costs of technology adoption and patent age. Moreover, previously traded
patents are more likely to be traded and renewed than untraded ones.
To parallel our focus in the theory, our empirical work focuses on three aspects of the transfer
and renewal of patents. First, we identify six types of distinct patentees and examine their rates
of transfer and renewal. Second, we study the variation of the rates of transfer and renewal
across technology ﬁelds as well as the relative importance of small patentees versus their larger
counterparts in the rates of transfer for each technology ﬁeld. Third, we analyze the impact of
patent characteristics such as patent citations received, generality, and age in the dynamics of
the transfer and renewal of patents.
The aspects of the data we explore are important for understanding the process and the
beneﬁts of the transfer of technology. Because the ability to commercialize inventions—and
consequently the gains from trade—could diﬀer for diﬀerent ﬁrms, we must consider that the
rates of transfer can vary across type of patentees. As a result, we classify patents into six
types of patentees (individual private inventor patents, unassigned patents as of their grant
2Technology ﬁelds, patent citations received, patentees (i.e., patent owner/assignee as of the grant date of a
patent) and generality information was obtained from the NBER Patent data set (Hall, Jaﬀea n dT r a t j e n b e r g
[22]). The measure of generality of patent i is Generalityi =1−
Pni
j s2
ij,w h e r esij denotes the percentage of
citations received by patent i that belong to patent subclass j,o u to fni patent classes. The patent renewal
data is based on information from the USPTO Oﬃcial Gazette as collected in the USPTO Patent BIB data
base as of December 31, 2002.
3The beneﬁts of acquiring a patent rather than obtaining a license may be to reduce potential hold up
problems since patent ownership oﬀers a higher degree of residual control rights than a license does (Grossman
and Hart [21]).
2date [owned by their inventors]; small, medium and large innovators; and government agencies).
We deﬁne the size of innovators based on the number of patents granted in a given year.4 We
ﬁnd substantial diﬀerences in the rates of transfer across the types of patentees, with individual
private inventors and small innovators having the largest rates of transfer. These ﬁndings will
help us learn for whom the beneﬁts of patent trading are most likely to be important.
Second, since costs of technology adoption and the arrival of opportunities for surplus-
enhancing transfer could diﬀer across technology ﬁe l d s ,w el o o ka tt h er a t e so ft r a n s f e rf o r
various technology ﬁelds. We have divided technology into six ﬁelds (chemical, computer and
communication, drugs and medical, electricity and electronics, mechanical, and other). The
ﬁndings reveal some diﬀerences in the rates of transfer, with the drug and medical ﬁeld having
the highest rates. It is possible that part of these diﬀerences exist because the beneﬁts from
specialization varie across technology ﬁelds. As a result, we also examine the diﬀerences in the
r a t e so ft r a n s f e ro ft y p eo fp a t e n t e e sf o rs e p a r a t et e c h n o l o g yﬁelds. We then ﬁnd substantial
diﬀerences between the rates of transfer of small innovators and their larger counterparts across
technology ﬁelds. In addition, the technology ﬁelds with the largest diﬀerence do not neces-
sarilly correspond to the ones with the highest rates of transfer. For instance, small and large
innovators in the computer and communications technology ﬁeld transfer respectively 23.9%
and 7.9% of their patents; meanwhile, their rates of transfer in the chemical ﬁeld are 17.25 and
12.5% respectively. However, while 14.9% of chemical patents are traded, the rate of transfer
is just 12.9% in computer and communications. This evidence will allow us to learn about the
variation of costs of technology adoption, the arrival for surplus-enhancing transfer and the
beneﬁts from specialization across technology ﬁelds.
Third, because the rates of transfer and renewal could also depend on patent characteristics
such as age, revenue, and the broadness of the patent, we study the impact of these elements as
measured by number of years since the patent grant date, the total number of patent citations
received by a given age, and the generality of the patent. The empirical analysis reveals that
the probability of a patent being traded indeed depends on a number of factors: the age of
the patent, the number of citations received by a given age, the patent generality, as well as
whether or not the patent has been previously traded and if so, the number of years since the
last trade. These facts provide some evidence on how to compare traded and untraded patents,
the importance of traded patents and the life cycle proﬁle of patented technologies.
The new data on the transfer of patents opens up new avenues of research. For example,
now we are able to better analyze small small ﬁrms that specialize in innovations and the selling
of those creations to larger ﬁrms. Plus we are now able to estimate the gains from trade in
t h em a r k e tf o rp a t e n t s( S e r r a n o[ 4 6 ] )a n dt oe x a m i n et ow h a te x t e n tt h em o v et o w a r d sh i g h e r
4We deﬁne small innovators patents as those initially owned by corporations that were granted no more than
5 patents in a given year. Large innovators patents are those issued to corporations with more than 100 patents
granted in a given year. Medium innovators patents make up the rest.
3protection of intellectual property rights that occurred in the mid 1980s facilitated specialization
and trade in patents. Heretofore, the new data will allow researchers to assess these questions
in more detail than in previous studies.
In addition to the empirical literature on patents, our work also relates to the literature on
markets for technology. To the best of our knowledge, Lamoreaux and Sokoloﬀ [28][29] and
this paper are the only ones that explore patent assignments to study markets for technology.
They use a sample of sales of private inventors patents and provide a historical account of
whether organized markets for technology existed in the late 19th and early 20th century. Our
work complements previous research on strategic alliances and licensing. Theoretical work has
analyzed the impact of licensing on the pattern of innovation, the gains from trade and the
sale of ideas.5 Empirical work has used data on strategic alliances and university technology
transfer oﬃces to examine the structure of licensing contracts, the emergence of specialized
research organizations, the allocation of control rights, and technology transfer at universities.6
To put this empirical work in contrast to ours, the main diﬀerence between the licensing and
the transfer of patents is that while the former constitutes a permission of use or a promise by
the licensor not to sue the licensee, the latter involves the transfer by a party of its right, title,
and interest in a patent.7
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and describes some of its
predictions. Section 3 explains the characteristics of the new data and section 4 documents
the patterns. Section 5 concludes the paper. The reader who most interested in the patterns
of transfer and renewal can skip sections 2 and 3 and go directly to 4. Finally, the appendix
contains several tables.
2 A Model of patent transfers and renewals
It is useful to initially present an organizing framework for understanding some of the empirical
regularities that we will develop later. This section presents a model detailing the transfer and
renewal of patents. We will consider the problem faced by an agent who holds a patent and
we will also make a number of predictions concerning both the probability of a patent being
traded and its expiring.
5Gallini and Winter [16], Katz and Shapiro [27], Shepard [47], Anton and Yao [5] , Gans and Stern [13], etc.
6Some of the studies that have used data on strategic alliances and licensing data are Arora [6]; Lerner and
Merges [32]; Anand and Khanna [3]; Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella [7]; Gans, Hsu, and Stern [14], etc. Some
studies that have used data on licensing by universities are Agrawal and Henderson [2], Sampat and Ziedonis
[41], etc.
7Our paper also relates to the industrial organization literature on business transfers and exit, mergers, and
reallocation (Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson [12]; Pakes and Ericson [39]; Holmes and Schmitz [24]; Mitchell
and Mulherin [34]; Andrade and Staﬀord [4]; Graﬀ, Rausser and Small [17]; Maksimovic and Phillips [33];
Jovanovic and Rousseau [26].)
4The problem for an agent is to decide whether to keep, sell, or let a patent expire. Pakes
and Schankerman [37] and Schankerman and Pakes [42] examine the problem of a patent owner
deciding in each period of whether or not to pay a renewal fee in a context with heterogeneity
in the economic value of inventions. Building on their framework, we will consider that patents
may be traded because some ﬁrms can generate higher revenue than others using a given patent,
but transfering a patent and adopting the technology involves a ﬁxed cost to be incurred by
the buyer.8
The starting point of our theory is Pakes and Schankerman [37] and Schankerman and Pakes
[42]. They examine the problem of a patent owner deciding in each time period whether or not
to pay a renewal fee, and thereby extend the life of a patent, in a context with heterogeneity in
the economic value of inventions. The contribution of our theory is to introduce the possibility
that an alternative potential owners may have greater valuation for the patent than the current
owner. But to transfer a patent to a new owner involves a resource cost, a cost of technology
adoption, to be incurred by the buyer. In summary, whereas Pakes and Schankerman’s frame-
work has one margin, should the patent owner pay the fee for renewing the patent, our model
has a second margin, should the cost of technology adoption be covered to reallocate the patent
to an alternative owner.
A l t e r n a t i v eo w n e r sc o u l dg e n e r a t eag r e a t e rp a t e n tv a l u et h a nac u r r e n to n eb e c a u s eo f
better production facilities, managerial skills, and complementary assets. To account for this
possibility, we consider that the best potential buyer of a patent with current revenue x is
c h a r a c t e r i z e db ya ni m p r o v e m e n tf a c t o rge ≥ 0 that generates revenue y = gex and represents
the arrival of opportunities for surplus-enhancing transfer via the sale of patents. We also assume
that the sharing rule of the gains from trade is eﬃcient and that the current owner obtains
all the surplus. This seller-takes-all-of-the-surplus assumption will be useful for our analysis;
however, allowing the buyer to capture some positive surplus as long as the sharing rule is
eﬃcient will not alter our qualitative results.
Let Va(x,ge) be the expected discounted value of patent protection to the agent just prior to
the ath renewal of a patent with revenue x if kept by current owner, and with an improvement
factor ge when sold to the potential buyer. If the renewal fee is not paid, then the patent expires
and Va(x,ge)=0 . If the renewal fee is paid, the owner earns the current revenue x and keeps
the patent until the next renewal date. If the cost of technology adoption and the renewal fee
are paid, then the buyer earns patent revenue y and obtains the ownership of the patent.
Va(x,g
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8The model does not consider a number of important issues such as licensing, strategic considerations,
asymmetry of information, the design and use of incentives in contracts of technology transfer, the demand for
liquidity, etc.
5Where L is the maximum legal length of patent protection, V K
a (x,ge) and V S
a (x,ge) are the
values of keeping and selling the patent, respectively. The latter values are deﬁned as the sum
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Where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, τ is the cost of adopting a technology9 and Ege[.] is
the expectation operator over the random variable ge with cdf Fge. Finally, the initial patent
revenue is distributed with cdf Fx1 and patent revenue depreciates deterministically between
periods at a ﬁxed rate δ ∈ (0,1) as in Pakes and Schankerman. The deterministic rate implies
that when the patent is kept, x0 = δx, a n dw h e ni ti ss o l d ,x0 = δy.
To illustrate the economic forces at play in the decision of a patent owner, consider a patent
of age a with revenue x at the beginning of a period and with a potential buyer characterized by
an improvement factor ge. The patent will be sold when the improvement factor is large enough
so that the ﬁxed costs of adopting the technology can be amortized over time. If we look at an
older patent with the same current revenue, it is less likely to be sold because when the patent
horizon is shorter, a higher improvement factor is needed to amortize the costs of adoption.
Furthermore, if we ﬁx the age of the patent, we ﬁnd that the higher the patent revenue x is, the
lower the improvement factor needed to amortize the cost of adoption. A lower improvement
factor is needed because the diﬀerence between the value of keeping and selling the patent,
i.e., V S
a (x,ge) − V K
a (x,ge), increases with x as does the diﬀerence between the revenue of the
potential buyer and the current owner, y − x. T h e s ea r et h em a i nt r a d eo ﬀs in the decision
problem of a patent owner.
More formally, Serrano [46] shows that functions—b ge
a(x,τ) and b xa(τ)—exist that divide the
policy space into three areas (keep, sell or let the patent expire) as illustrated in Figure 1. The
cutoﬀ b ge
a(x,τ) is the improvement factor that makes a patent owner indiﬀerent between selling or
not selling a patent with revenue x and age a.T h er e v e n u eb xa(τ) makes the owner indiﬀerent
between keeping the patent or letting it expire. An owner facing a potential buyer with an
improvement factor above b ge
a(x,τ) will sell the patent. Moreover, as long as the improvement
factor is lower than b ge
a(x,τ), patents with lower revenues than b xa(τ) will be allowed to expire
and then ones with revenues higher than b xa(τ) will be renewed.
The model has two theoretical results, namely the selection and horizon eﬀect, as well as
a number of testable implications.10 Serrano proves that for a ﬁxed age, the function b ge
a(x,τ)
9There is little evidence on estimates of costs of technology transfer. ˘ Astebro [9] studies the adoption of both
CAD and CNC technologies and ﬁnds that there are large ﬁxed noncapital and capital costs of adoption.
10There are several key elements that allow Serrano to prove these results. One is that the cost of technology















is decreasing with x, implying that the probability of a patent being traded is increasing with
x. That is, the higher the revenue x is, the lower the improvement ge needed for the owner of
t h ep a t e n tt ob ei n d i ﬀerent between selling it or not. We call this the selection eﬀect because
traded patents—and especially those that have been recently traded—have, on average, a higher
revenue prior to a potential trading date than the previously untraded ones. This selection
eﬀect will show why previously traded patents are more likely to be traded and less likely to
be allowed to expire than the previously untraded ones as presented in Section 4. The second
result illustrates that for a ﬁxed patent revenue x, the function b ge
a(x,τ) is increasing with a,
which implies that the probability of an active patent being traded decreases with age for a
ﬁxed revenue x. That is, as a patent with a ﬁxed revenue x gets older, the owners must meet
better potential buyers in order to be indiﬀerent between selling the patent or not. We call this
the horizon eﬀect because a shorter horizon implies less time to amortize the cost of adopting
a technology. The horizon eﬀect will show why the probability of an active patent being traded
decreases with age, with the exception of the renewal dates as presented in Section 4.
T h ef a c tt h a tm a n d a t o r yr e n e w a lf e e si nt h eU . S .p a t e n ts y s t e ma r en o td u ea n n u a l l yc r e a t e s
some interesting testable implications. Our model predicts that two opposing forces determine
the probability of a patent being traded the year immediately following its renewal date.11 On
the one hand, the probability of an active patent being traded may increase after a renewal
date because the average revenue of the renewed patents is higher than the average revenue of
adoption is ﬁxed and does not fully internalize how the diﬀerence between the value of selling or not selling
a patent changes as the revenue and age of the patent varies, i.e., the cost of technology adoption is not
proportional to the diﬀerence between the value of not selling and selling the patent (net of the cost). Another
important element of the structure of the model is that the improvement factor ge is independent of the age and
revenue of the patent. This simpliﬁes the process ge and implies that the buyer’s per period patent revenue
depends on the revenue of the current owner. If the revenue of the potential buyer was independent of the
revenue of the current owner, then neither the selection nor the horizon eﬀect would generally hold.
11In the U.S. patent system, mandatory renewal patent fees are due at the end of the 4th, 8th and 12th year.
If the fees are not paid, then the patent expires.
7the existing patents immediately prior to the renewal date. Consequently, the sample selection
generated by the renewal decision, and the result that patents with higher revenue are more
likely to be traded (we will call this the renewal sample selection eﬀect), implies a discrete jump
in the probability that an active patent will be traded immediately following its renewal date.12
On the other hand, this probability might decrease as the revenue of patents depreciate and
their ages increase over the year immediately following their renewal dates. This is because
when the revenue decreases with age, the selection eﬀect implies that the probability of a patent
being traded decreases; when a patent is older, the horizon eﬀect implies that the probability
of a patent being traded decreases as well. Therefore, we should observe a discrete jump in the
empirical probability of an active patent being traded the year immediately following a renewal
date only when the renewal sample selection is the dominant eﬀect.
In short, we ﬁnd a number of new implications. First, the selection eﬀect implies that for
ﬁxed age a, the probability of an active patent being traded increases with its revenue. As
a result, previously traded patents—and especially the recently traded—are more likely to be
retraded and renewed than the previously untraded ones, and that the probability of an active
patent being traded may increase immediately after a renewal date. Second, the horizon eﬀect
implies that for a ﬁxed revenue x, the probability of an active patent being traded decreases
with age, except in the year immediately after its renewal date when this probability may
discretely increase.
Remark: This paper models the transfer of the ownership of patents but does not explicity
consider the licensing of patents.13 Because patent revenue can represent both the proceeds of
adopting and using a technology, as well as the ones that the owner could additionally obtain
by licensing the patent to others, the model can to some extent account for the licensing of
patents. In this context, the improvement factor process illustrates the arrival of opportunities
for surplus-enhancing via the sale of patents versus their licensing. One limitation of this
explanation is that while in the current model14 the opportunities for surplus-enhancing transfer
via the sale of patents evolve stochastically, the implicit arrival of opportunities to license a
patent does not because revenue is deterministic.15 That is, when the revenue growth process
is deterministic over time, we are explicity excluding the possibility that revenues could grow
because of the arrival of licensing opportunities. Another limitation is that we assume that the
12This is because the distribution of per period revenue immediately after a renewal decision stochastically
dominates the distribution of revenue prior to a renewal date.
13There is no systematic data on patent licensing revenue, but there is anecdotal evidence. IBM’s licensing
revenue was $1.6 billion in the year 2000 (Berman[10] as reported in Merrill, Levin and Myers [48]). In 1996 U.S.
corporations received $66 billion in income from royalties of unaﬃliated entities(Degnan[11]). Texas Instruments
reported to have obtained $1.6 billion in licensing royalties from 1996 to 2003(Grindley and Teece[19]).
14Serrano [46] considers a model where both the internal process of how revenues evolve as well as the arrival
for surplus-enhancing transfer are stochastic. However, the internal process of growth of revenues is decreasing
with the age of the patent.
15We thank a referee for pointing out this issue.
8beneﬁts of the sale versus the licensing of patents do not diﬀer over the life cycle of patents.
Furthermore, the economic process we have considered here assumes that buyers of patents
are adopters and users of the acquired technology rather than ﬁrms specializing in managing
patents. For instance, a ﬁrm could exclusively focus on managing a patent by licensing it to
many others who can then adopt it16, but ﬁrms exclusively managing patents are a rather new
organizational form mainly associated with ﬁrms acquiring patents for prospective litigation
purposes.
3 Measuring transfer of technology with the USPTO as-
signment data
There are several aspects of the assignment data that allow us to analyze in detail the transfer
of technology. In contrast to strategic alliance and license transactions, the transfer of the
ownership of patents is most often recorded because of the legal requirement that all assignments
have to be ﬁlled with the USPTO in order to be legally binding.17 In addition, technology
transfer agreements in the form of assignments contain patent numbers, which allow us to link
these transfers to technology ﬁelds, patentees and patent characteristics.18 Therefore, we can
analyze aspects of the dynamics of the transfer of technology in more detail than previous
s t u d i e sh a v ed o n e .
The rest of this section is divided into three parts. First, we present the contents of the
assignment data. Second, we discuss the general principles that led to the decisions made in
the construction of the new data set. Third, we describe the contents of the new data set.
Original assignment data The main source of our data is the USPTO Patent Assign-
ment Database . Patent assignments acknowledge the transfer by a party of the rights, title
and interest in a patent or bundle of patents. A typical assignment is characterized by a unique
identiﬁer (i.e., reel frame), the name of the buyer (i.e., assignee) and the seller (i.e., assignor),19
the date that the assignment was recorded at the patent oﬃce (i.e., recorded date), the date
the private agreement between the parties was signed (i.e., execute or signed date), the number
of patents or patent applications included in the assignments, and the type of the assignment,
16We thank a referee for pointing out this issue.
17The recordation of the transfer of patents as well as many other transactions of assets like houses is not
mandatory, but only recorded transfers of patents at the USPTO act as evidence of a bona ﬁde purchase in
courts. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence from interviews with patent lawyers strongly supports the eﬀective
recordation of transfer of patents.
18One notable exception where a sample of strategic alliances is linked to patent numbers is the work of Gans,
Hsu, and Stern [14]. They focused on a small sample of licensing agreements of biotechnology companies.
19The names of the buyer and seller in the Patent Assignment Data Base were never standarized by the
USPTO.
9which acknowledges the rational of the transfer (i.e., brief).20 We obtained records of the daily
trades that occurred between August 1, 1980 to December 31, 2001.
Data construction H e r ew ew i l ld e s c r i b et h et h r e em a i np r i n c i p l e st h a tl e dt ot h ed e -
cisions made in the construction of the data set. The details of the procedures we use to deal
with the assignment data are explained in the on-line appendix of this paper. First, since our
main interest in the new data ultimately lies in the reallocation of the ownership of patents
for technological purposes, we separate assignments recorded as administrative events, such as
a name change, a security interest, a correction, etc. Second, we focus on the transaction of
patents across ﬁrm boundaries. Since many recorded assignments represent transactions be-
tween inventors-employers and their employees-assignees as of the grant date of the patent, we
identify their names and exclude these assignments (i.e., ﬁrst assignments). Subsequent assign-
ments (i.e., reassignments) of these patents are included in our data. For future reference, we
deﬁne “trades”, “transfers” and "reassignments" as reallocations of patents across ﬁrm bound-
aries. Finally, we link the assignment records at the patent level to existing patent data on
patent renewals, citations, generality, technology ﬁeld, the name of the assignee as of the grant
date of the patent, and other patent characteristics.
Contents of the transfer data. The new data set is a panel of U.S. utility21 patents
granted since January 1, 1983 and subject to renewal fees22 whose history of trades and renewal
decisions took place up to the end of the year 2001. We identiﬁed six types of patentees
according to the grant dates of their patents (individual private inventor patents; unassigned
patents as of the grant date owned by the inventors; small, medium and large innovators;
and government agencies).23 Similarly, we divided patents into six technology ﬁelds (chemical,
computer and communications, drugs and medical, electrical and electronics, mechanical and
other). In addition, we categorized patents by their importance and scope, as measured by the
20Patent transactions can be recorded for several reason. To acknowledge the outright sale of patents (i.e.,
assignment of assignors), the union of two or more commercial interests (i.e., mergers), the securitization of a
patent as a collateral (i.e., security interest), the change of name of its current owner (i.e., change of name) and
the correction of a previous record (i.e., pro nunc tunc), etc.
21Utility patents represent the most common type of patent.
22In the U.S. patent system, patents applied for after December 12, 1980 are subject to renewal fees at the
end of years 4, 8 and 12 since its grant date. If renewal fees are not paid, then the patents expire. In the U.S.
s y s t e m ,t h em a x i m u mp o s s i b l et e r mo fa ni s s u e dp a t e n t( assuming that any required renewal fees are paid) was
17 years until June 8, 1995. We use patents granted since January 1, 1983 because on average the application
period of a granted patent is 2.5 years. We excluded patent applications that were never granted because the
USPTO does not make this data available for patents applied for before 2001.
23When a patentee is a corporation, we can add a measure of the size of the ﬁrm as of the grant date of the
patent. While we would like to use standard measures of ﬁrm size like employees or assets, it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd
such measures for all the patentees. Small innovators patents are deﬁned as those owned by corporations that
were granted no more than 5 patents in a given year. Large innovators patents are those issued to corporations
with more than 100 patents granted in a given year. Medium innovators patents make up the rest.
10number of patent citations received and their respective generality (patent citations received
and generality are deﬁn e da si nH a l l ,J a ﬀe and Tratjenberg [22]). Table A-1 in the appendix
provides summary statistics about granted and traded patents by type of patentee.24
The new data is not without drawbacks. First, after a patent has been granted, the name of
the ﬁrst buyer, and all its subsequent sellers and buyers, are not standardized by the USPTO.
Second, we cannot distinguish the acquisition of a ﬁrm from the acquisition of a bundle of
patents.25 Third, we do not have information on the price paid for the patents transferred.
Fourth, one must recognize that patents which are traded in large blocks might not represent
technology transfers. As a result, the economic forces that we highlight in our model will be
more salient for small innovators and individually owned patents.26 Fifth, the data does not
allow us to distinguish between patents being acquired by ﬁrms who adopt the technology and
ﬁrms who might specialize in managing patents by licensing them to many others who can then
adopt them. Firms exclusively managing patents, however, are a rather new organizational
form mainly associated with ﬁrms acquiring patents for prospective litigation purposes. For
this reason, we expect that the majority of the transfers in our data set represent the adoption
of a technology. Finally, since we have no systematic data on licensing transactions at the
patent level, we cannot assure whether our empirical ﬁndings also apply to alternative methods
of technology transfer like the licensing of patents.
4 Patterns of the transfer and renewal of patents
Our empirical analysis focuses on three aspects. First, we examine the rates of transfer and
renewal for several types of patentees. Second, we study the rates of transfer and renewal
across technology ﬁelds as well as the diﬀerences in the importance of small type of patentees
versus their larger counterparts in the rates of transfer. Third, we look at the impact of
patent characteristics such as age, patent citations received, and generality in the dynamics of
the transfer and renewal of patents. The robustness of the patterns is analyzed using a logit
model.27
24We thank a referee for suggesting we consider the variable generality.
25In the hypothetical case that a small innovator was acquired rather than a bundle of its patents, we consider
that it might be acquired mainly because of the value of its technological assets. In this scenario, the transfer
will likely involve a cost of adopting and, especially setting up the technology in the new ﬁrm. Thus, to some
extent, the acquisition of an innovative ﬁrm would not necessarily be diﬀerent than the transfer of its patents.
26Studying both small innovators and individually-owned patents is interesting in their own right, given the
importance they play in the innovation process (Acs and Audretsch [1]; Arrow [8]).
27The parametric analysis is useful because facilitates to test the robustness of our ﬁndings. Similar results
should be obtained analyzing the data using alternative parametric models.
11Table 1: Proportion of Patents Traded and Expired by Type of Patentees
Individual owners Corporations (Innovators) Govt. Agenc.
All Unassigned Priv. Inventors All Small Medium Large
A. Proportion of patents traded over their life cycle by type of patentees
Unweighed 12.4 12.2 16.2 14.0 17.5 14.6 10.5 4.1
Weighed by
citations 19.0 18.7 24.1 17.2 24.0 17.4 11.4 6.0
B. Proportion of patents expired up to the last renewal fee by type of patentees
Unweighed 77.5 77.7 73.1 55.1 60.3 55.5 50.0 83.5
Weighed by
citations 68.4 68.9 62.0 43.2 48.8 42.8 39.1 74.4
Note: the proportions of this table are created using a pooling of all U.S. patents granted from 1983 to 2001.
Table 2: Proportion of Patents Traded and Expired by Technology Field and Type of Patentee
Computer Drugs & Elec. &
Chemical & Comm Medical Electro. Mechanical Other All
A. Proportion of patents traded over their life cycle by patent categories
Individual owned patents 16.1 15.8 17.0 14.7 11.6 10.1 12.4
Unassigned 16.1 15.6 16.8 14.4 11.3 9.9 12.2
Priv. Inventor 15.7 19.1 20.1 19.5 16.1 13.7 16.2
Corporations (Innovators) 15.0 13.0 16.0 14.0 12.3 14.9 14.0
Small 17.2 23.9 20.1 18.2 15.7 16.2 17.5
Medium 15.8 16.9 14.2 15.4 12.0 14.1 14.6
Large 12.5 7.9 13.3 11.2 8.5 12.3 10.5
Govt. Agencies 4.0 2.6 4.4 4.6 4.7 3.2 4.1
All 14.9 12.9 16.0 13.8 12.0 13.1 13.55
B. Proportion of patents expired up to the last renewal fee by patent categories
Individual owned patents 77.5 73.0 69.3 68.4 74.1 81.1 77.5
Unassigned 72.8 69.8 69.0 74.6 79.3 81.3 77.7
Priv. Inventor 75.6 62.3 60.1 66.3 77.0 77.1 73.1
Corporations (Innovators) 58.3 44.6 54.5 51.9 56.7 60.1 55.1
Small 59.0 54.2 53.2 58.7 62.4 63.9 60.3
Medium 58.5 46.6 54.1 52.5 57.2 57.3 55.5
Large 57.6 40.6 59.1 48.1 49.0 53.6 50.0
Govt. Agencies 80.7 91.6 65.1 84.3 86.5 86.8 83.5
All 60.0 47.3 57.4 55.1 61.7 67.9 59.55
Note: the proportions of this table are created using a pooling of all U.S. patents granted from 1983 to 2001 and their
trading and renewal decisions.
124.1 The transfer and renewal of patents across type of patentees
Our analysis of the transfer and renewal data begins by describing the rates of transfer across
type of patentees. Table 1A reports both the values of the probability of a patent being traded
over its life cycle and the same probability weighted by the total number of patent citations
received.28 There are two elements from this table that we would like to highlight. First, there is
a substantial diﬀerence in the rates of transfer across type of patentees, with individual private
inventor and small innovators selling respectively 16.2% and 17.5% of their patents. Meanwhile,
large innovators and government agencies have the lowest rates of transfer with 10.5% and 4.1%
of their respective patents. Second, when we weight the rates of transfer by the importance of
the patent, as measured by patent citations received, the rates increase substantially, especially
for small innovators and individual owners (unassigned patents and private inventors). As
a result, the diﬀerences in the rates of transfer between type of patentees, now measured in
"importance", are much larger than in absolute rates. For instance, while small innovators
transfer 17.5% of patents and their larger counterparts transfer 10.5%, the same rates weighted
by patent citations received are 24% and 11.4%.29
The expiration rates of patents by the last renewal fee at age 13 also vary substantially across
type of patentees. Table 1B presents these rates. The evidence reveals that larger assignees are
more likely to renew their patents than both their smaller counterparts and invidual inventors.
For instance, the cummulative expiration rates of small innovators and individual owners are
respectively 77.5% and 60.3%, while just 50% of large innovators patents are let to expire.
The comparison of the transfer and renewal rates reveals substantial diﬀerences across type
of patentees, with small innovators and individual owner patents more likely to be traded and
to expire than those held by larger patentees. This evidence is consistent with a process of
arrival of substantial opportunities for surplus-enhancing transfer via the sale of patents from
small to large patentees.
4.2 The transfer and renewal of patents across technology ﬁelds
The next aspect we focus on is the transfer and renewal of patents across technology ﬁelds. We
have divided technology ﬁelds into six groups (chemical, computer and communication, drugs
and medical, electricity and electronics, mechanical and other). Table 2A presents the cross-
28Here, total patent citations are the total number of citations received by the maximum legal length of patent
protection. This is the sum of citations received from the patent’s grant date up until the maximum legal length
of patent protection. Similar results are obtained when the weighs are based on the total citations received by
a given year, i.e., that is the sum of patent citations received from the patent’s grant year until the year the
patent is up for trade or renewal.
29I will be omitting the standard errors of the proportions. They are small because the number of observations
is large. They range from 3.6 times smaller than the point estimates for computer and communication patents
held by government agencies to 155 times smaller than the estimates for patents held by corporations.
13tabulations of the cummulative transfer rates across technology ﬁelds and type of patentees.
The bottom of the table presents the aggregate rates of transfer by technology ﬁeld. The column
at the far right shows the aggregate rates of transfer by type of patentee.
There are three aspects in this table that are noteworthy. First, there is some variation in
the aggregate rates of transfer across technology ﬁelds. For instance, the lowest rate of transfer
is 12% in the mechanical ﬁeld while the highest rate is 16% in drugs and medical. Second, and
perhaps more interesting, is that there are large diﬀerences across technology ﬁelds between the
rates of transfer of small patentees and their larger counterparts. For instance, small and large
innovators in the computer and communications technology ﬁeld transfer respectively 23.9%
and 7.9% of their patents; meanwhile, their rates of transfer in the chemical ﬁeld are 17.25 and
12.5% respectively. Third, these diﬀerences in the relative importance of the rates of transfer
of type of patentees are not necessarily larger in the technology ﬁelds with the highest rates of
transfer. In particular, while 14.9% of chemical patents are traded, the rate of transfer is just
12.9% in the computer and communications technology ﬁeld.
Table 2B reports the rates of expiration across technology ﬁelds by the last renewal date at
age 13. We also ﬁnd substantial diﬀerences in the proportion of patents allowed to expire across
technology ﬁelds, ranging from a low of 47.3% in the computer and communication ﬁeld to a
high of 67.9% in the miscellaneous (i.e., other) ﬁeld.30 Another noteworthy ﬁnding expressed
in this table is that while the diﬀerences in cummulative expiration rates of small versus large
innovators are of the order of 10 to 20 percentage points in the computer and communication,
electric and electronics, mechanical and other ﬁelds, the diﬀerence vanishes in the chemical ﬁeld
and even reverses in the drugs and medical ﬁeld where large innovator patents are more likely
to expire than those held by smaller innovators.
In short, the results reveal that the rates of transfer, and especially the expiration rates,
vary across technology ﬁelds and that there are substantial diﬀerences in the rates of transfer
of smaller versus larger type of patentees across technology ﬁelds. We think the ﬁndings on
the transfer of patents suggest that the determinants of specialization in research may not
necessarily be the same ones that determine the aggregate levels of transfer of patents across
technology ﬁelds.
4.3 Patent characteristics and the transfer and renewal of patents
In this section we move on to examine the impact of a number of factors in the probability of
a patent being traded and allowed to expire, as well as the life cycle properties of the transfer
30While the diﬀerences in the rate of transfer and expiration across technology ﬁelds and patentees are
signiﬁcant, they could also depend on the patterns of patenting by patentees and the characteristics of their
patents. To account for this possibility, we run logit models for both the trading and the expiring decision
regressed on a number patent characteristics as controls. The diﬀerences were somewhat smaller, but the rates
were similar.
14and renewal of patents.31
We begin by examining the impact of the total number of patent citations received by a
given age on the decision to transfer a patent.32 To address this issue, we regress the decision
to trade an active patent on the total number of patent citations received by a given age and
technology ﬁeld dummies.33 The positive coeﬃcient of the total number of patent citations
received indicates that patents with a higher number of total patent citations received by a
given age are more likely to be traded (see Table A-2A in the appendix). For instance, we
ﬁnd that an extra citation increases the predicted probability of a small innovator patent being
traded at age 7 by about 0.02 percentage points as compared to the mean of the sample, i.e.,
increasing the rate from 1.92% to 1.94%. Moreover, this predicted probability increases to 2.13%
when it is evaluated at the 95 percentile of total citations. The estimates we ﬁnd are signiﬁcant
at standard levels, they are robust to a number of speciﬁcations, and the dummy variables are
jointly signiﬁcant.34 To the extent that patent citations by a given age are positively correlated
with revenue to patent protection, this pattern is consistent with the result that, for a ﬁxed
age, patents with higher revenues are more likely to be traded, i.e., the selection eﬀect.
In addition, to address whether more frequently cited patents are more likely to be renewed,
we regress the decision to let an active patent expire on the total number of patent citations
received by a given age and technology ﬁeld dummies. The negative coeﬃcient of the patent
citations received illustrates that frequently cited patents are more likely to be renewed (see
Table A-2B in the appendix). We ﬁnd that an extra citation decreases the predicted probability
of a small innovator patent being allowed to expire at age 13 by about 1 percentage point as
compared to the mean of the sample, i.e., decresing from 36.9% to 35.9%. Furthermore, this
predicted probability decreases to 27.1% when evaluated at the 95 percentile of total citations.
The estimates we ﬁnd are signiﬁcant at standard levels, they are robust to technology ﬁeld and
type of patentee dummies, and the dummy variables are jointly signiﬁcant.
31I will be generally omitting the standard errors of the proportions in the Tables below. Standard errors are
generally small because the number of observations is large. We have calculated upper bounds of the standard
errors based on the number of observations of patents granted from 1983 to 1985. They range from 2 times
smaller than the point estimates of patents traded at age 17 that were previously traded one year ago, to 32
times smaller than the point estimates of patents traded at age 2 that were not previously traded. The reader
can ﬁnd the upper bounds of the standard errors in the on-line appendix.
32Since there is no systematic data on licensing, we are consequently neglecting the possibility that some
patents that are not sold may be licensed. To the extent that licensed patents were more likely to receive patent
citations than patents neither transferred nor licensed, the eﬀect of patent citations received as a determinant
to the decision to sell versus neither selling nor licensing a patent could be under estimated.
33Here, total number of patent citations received by a given age is the sum of citations received from the
grant year of the patent to the year it is up for trade or renewal. Similar results are obtained when using the
total number of citations received by the maximum legal length of patent protection.
34There is one exception: the regression for the sample of patents of large innovators. The negative coeﬃcient
of patent citations is based on patents that belong to electrical and electronics. In the rest of the technology
ﬁelds, the coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant or not statistically signiﬁcant. Moreover, when we estimate the
probability of a granted patent being traded using the same explanatory variables, the eﬀect of citations is
signiﬁcant across type of patentees and robust to technology ﬁelds.
15T h en e x ti s s u ew ea d d r e s si st h ei m p a c to fp a t e n tg enerality on both the transfer of patents
and renewal. First, we look at the transfer decision. To do this, we run a regression of the
decision to trade a patent on patent generality and technology ﬁeld dummies. The positive
coeﬃcient of generality indicates that patents with higher generality are more likely to be
traded (see Table A-3A in the appendix). For instance, we ﬁnd that the predicted probability
of a small innovator patent being traded at age 9 when evaluated at the sample mean is 2.00%;
and it increases to 2.17% at the 95 percentile of generality. These estimates are signiﬁcant at
standard levels, they are robust to technology ﬁeld and type of patentee dummies, and the
dummy variables are jointly signiﬁcant.35
The second aspect of generality we look at is its relationship with the renewal of patents.
The results of regressing the decision to let a patent expire on patent generality and technology
ﬁeld dummies reveal that patents with higher generality are more likely to renewed (see Table
A-3B in the appendix). In particular, we ﬁnd that the predicted probability of a small innovator
patent expiring at age 9 when evaluated at the sample mean of generality is 27.8%,decreasing to
26.0% when evaluated at the 95 percentile of generality. The estimates we ﬁnd are statistically
signiﬁcant at standard levels and they are robust to technology ﬁeld and type of patentee
dummies. In addition, when we add the variable total number of patent citations received to the
generality regressions, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of patent generality maintains a substantial
explanatory power in the trading decision but its importance is largely reduced in the regression
of the expiring decision. That is, the generality strongly aﬀe c tt h et r a d eo fp a t e n t sa n dm i l d l y
aﬀect the renewal decision. This result conﬁrms that patent generality captures well the arrival
of opportunities for surplus-enhancing transfer as interpreted by the improvement factor process
of the model of patent transfers.
We now turn our attention to the longitudinal aspects of the data. We ﬁrst compare the
rates of trading and renewal of previously traded and untraded patents. In assessing the process
of technology transfer, one must understand whether the fundamental aspect of technology
transfer is dominated by a substantial arrival of opportunities for surplus-enhancing transfer
or by ﬁnding a good match between a technology and a ﬁrm. The ﬁrst process may involve
subsequent transfers of a patent as newer opportunities for surplus-enhancing transfer appear
overtime. The second process may be characterized by previously traded patents displaying
lower rates of transfer than the untraded ones, as trades are supposed to enhance the match
between ﬁrms and patents. Table 3 presents the proportion of active patents traded and left
to expire as a function of whether or not the patents were previously traded and the number
of years since their last trade. The ﬁgures in the table are the pooled proportion of small
innovators patents granted from 1983 to 2001. There are two results we want to highlight.
First, the probability of an active patent being traded for a previously traded patent is higher
35Government agency patents are an exception to this result.
16Table 3: Patents Traded and Expired for Small Innovators
A. Patents Traded as a Percentage of All Active Patents
Previously Traded (Years since last trade)
Age of Patent (Years) All Not Previously Traded Any Year 1 2 3 4
1 2.505 - - - - - -
2 2.335 2.225 5.287 5.287 - - -
3 2.201 2.068 4.753 5.265 4.244 - -
4 2.179 2.007 4.453 5.043 4.291 4.025 -
5 2.220 1.989 4.407 5.324 4.527 3.840 3.769
6 2.017 1.753 4.068 4.935 4.127 3.765 4.103
7 1.902 1.621 3.805 4.963 3.750 3.796 3.567
8 1.885 1.565 3.801 4.962 3.860 4.075 3.595
9 1.937 1.566 3.789 4.825 3.162 3.915 3.878
10 1.779 1.404 3.494 3.839 3.369 4.825 3.221
11 1.676 1.354 3.042 3.937 3.618 3.671 2.836
12 1.540 1.264 2.626 3.276 3.851 2.537 2.411
13 1.675 1.331 2.868 2.001 2.273 4.721 3.280
14 1.680 1.330 2.847 3.234 2.774 4.513 4.070
15 1.362 1.008 2.497 2.802 2.189 2.698 3.0
16 1.157 0.861 2.075 2.229 1.559 3.817 1.439
17 0.841 0.608 1.539 1.818 1.181 2.821 1.976
B. Patents Expired as a Percentage of All Active Patents
Previously Traded (Years since last trade)
Age of Patent (Years) All Not Previously Traded Any Year 1 2 3 4
5 18.399 18.958 12.707 6.696 12.148 14.456 16.08
9 29.143 30.077 24.087 11.253 18.650 22.070 23.407
13 33.014 34.131 28.830 15.515 22.663 24.280 29.614
Note: the proportion of this table are created using a pooling of all U.S. patents granted from 1983 to 2001 and their trading and renewal decisions.
at any patent age than the one of an untraded one. As a matter of fact, the probability of a
small innovator patent being traded early in its life cycle, conditional on having being previously
t r a d e d ,i sa b o u tt w i c ea sl a r g ea st h ep r o b a b i l i t yo fi tb e i n gt r a d e df o ra nu n t r a d e dp a t e n t .T h i s
diﬀerence remarkably shrinks over the life cycle of patents (as showed in Figure 2). The second
result we want to highlight is that the probability of a previously traded patent expiring at any
renewal date is lower than that of an untraded patent. To assess the robustnes of these results,
we separately regress the decision to trade a patent and the one to let it expire on whether
a patent has been previously traded with a number of controls. The estimated coeﬃcient of
t h ev a r i a b l ep r e v i o u s l yt r a d e di sp o s i t i v ef o rt h et r a d i n gd e c i s i o na n dn e g a t i v ef o rt h ee x p i r i n g
one. Both estimates are statistically signiﬁcant in a number of speciﬁcations and the dummy
variables are jointly signiﬁcant, which conﬁrm our ﬁndings (see Table A-4 in the appendix for
more details). These ﬁndings are consistent with a theory of technology transfer where the
arrival of opportunities for surplus-enhancing transfer is a signiﬁcant element.
The second aspect of the longitudinal data we explore is the extent to which recently traded
patents are more likely to be traded and renewed than the rest of those previously traded.
The ﬁgures presented in the last four columns of Table 3 show that recently traded patents are
indeed more likely to be traded and renewed than other previously traded patents.36 To address
36In this case the standard errors of the proportions of older patents being traded are somewhat higher than
17Figure 2: The Number of Patents Traded as a Proportion of Active Patents Conditional on
Having Been Previously Traded or Not (Small Innovators)















the robustness of this pattern, we separately regress both the decision to traded a patent and
the decision to allow a patent to expire on the numbers of years since its last trade, the numbers
of years since its last trade squared, and technology ﬁeld dummies. The estimates conﬁrm that
our results are signiﬁcant at standard levels, that they are robust to technology ﬁeld and type
of patentee dummies, and also that the dummy variables are jointly signiﬁcant. Furthermore,
when we run separate regressions for each patentee, the results are similar (with.few exceptions
like patents of government agencies).
The third aspect we examine is the transfer and renewal decision over the life cycle of
patents. The ﬁrst column of Table 3 presents patents traded and patents expired as a percentage
of all active small innovator patents. There are three elements of this table concerning the life
cycle proﬁle of patents that are noteworthy. First, the ﬁgures representing the probability
of an active patent being traded reveal that this probability decreases with age, except in
the year immediately after a renewal date. This fact is consistent with the result that we
previuosly presented for which, for a ﬁxed revenue, the probability of a patent being traded
decreases with age because a shorter horizon implies less time to amortize costs of technology
adoption.model’s horizon eﬀect, i.e., horizon eﬀect. Second, the probability of an active patent
being traded increases the year immediately after a renewal date. To assess whether these jumps
are statistically signiﬁcant as well as robust across technology ﬁelds and type of patentees, we
regress the decision to trade a patent on age, technology ﬁeld dummies and type of patentees.
We ﬁnd that the estimates are indeed signiﬁcant, robust to a number of speciﬁcations and the
dummy variables are jointly signiﬁcant. Using these estimates, which are reported in Table A-6,
in other proportions previously presented because the number of observations decreases when we condition on
the number of years since the last trade and especially for older cohorts of granted patents.
18we ﬁnd that the jumps are signiﬁcant at standard levels for the sample of all patents and for
individually owned patents (private inventors and unassigned patents). For small innovators,
t h ej u m p sa r ea l s os i g n i ﬁcant but at somewhat higher levels.3738 A c c o r d i n gt op r e d i c t i o n so f
the model of patent transfers, the fact that the jumps exist imply that the renewal sample
selection eﬀect dominates the horizon eﬀect. Finally, the third noteworthy element is the rate
at which active patents are allowed to expire over their life cycle. The ﬁgures at the bottom of
the ﬁrst column of Table 3 reveal that this rate increases with patent age, which is consistent
with values to patent protection substantially decreasing over the life cycle of patents.
Remark: It is not easy to ﬁnd metrics to assess how economically and quantitatively
important the jumps of the probability of a patent being traded immediately after a renewal
date may be. One way is to test whether the jumps are robust across technology ﬁelds and
type of patentees, as well as statistically signiﬁcant, as we have already discussed. Another
way to assess the importance of these jumps may be to compare their levels in the years
immediately after renewal dates with those of previous years. Using this metric, we ﬁnd that
the jumps increase the probability of a patent being traded up to the levels attained two, three
or even four years prior to the year immediately after a renewal date. Therefore, we conclude
that these jumps seem to be both economically and quantitatively important, especially for
individual inventors and the smaller assignees.39
In summary, we ﬁnd that active patents with a higher number of patent citations received
and generality, as well as previously traded patents (especially the recently traded) are more
likely to be traded and renewed. The data also reveals that the probability that an active patent
37We test the following three null hypothesis for all the samples: i) age_year4≥age_year5; ii)
age_year8≥age_year9; and iii) age_year12≥age_year13. If the p values are suﬃciently low, then we can
reject the hypothesis and conclude that the jumps are signiﬁcant at a certain statistical signiﬁcance level. We
obtain the following p values. The ﬁrst to last number in the parenthesis represent null hypothesis i to iii.
All innovators (0.2819; 0.00; 0.00); individually owned patents (0.00; 0.00; 0.00), unassigned (0.00; 0.00; 0.00),
private inventors (0.0529; 0.0755; 0.03776), small innovators (0.140; 0.1468; 0.0308); medium innovators (0.9697;
0.0125; 0.00); large innovators (0.00; 0.00; 0.6461) and government agencies (0.777; 0.00; 0.4490). Similar results
are obtained when the sample proportions are used instead of the age dummies as well as when technology ﬁeld
controls are added.
38When we estimate the probability of a patent being traded on age dummies and total citations received
by a given age, the jumps of the age dummies after a renewal date are smaller than when the variable total
citations received by a given age is not included. To the extent that the number of total citations received by
a given year is positively correlated with the revenue to patent protection of a patented innovation, the result
is consistent with the implications of the theoretical model considered in the paper. The fact that these jumps
do not dissapear may be because total citations received might not a perfect measure of the value to patent
protection. Patent citations received are not necessarily a perfect measure of value to patent protection because
they are not received contemporaneously with patent protection, they may represent spillovers and can be made
as a reference to prior art.
39T oi n v e s t i g a t ef u r t h e rt h ei s s u eo ft h ej u m p si nt h ep r obabilty of a patent being traded immediately after a
renewal date, we examine the eﬀects of focusing on a sample of only patents that are not let to expire. In this
context we ﬁnd that there are no jumps in the rate of transfer immediately after a renewal date. This suggests
that the mechanism that our model highlights works, i.e., it is necessary that the relative proportion of high
value patents increases after their lower value counterparts are left to expire on a renewal date.
19Figure 3: The Number of Patents Traded as a Proportion of Active Patents (Small Innovators
and Individual Owned Patents)















willl be traded decreases with age, with one exception, which is the year immediately after a
renewal date. Finally, we also show that the probability of an active patent being allowed to
expire increases with age.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has provided a summary of the patterns revealed by a new data set on the transfer
and renewal of patents. This empirical work has focused on three aspects of the data. The
ﬁrst aspect we looked at was whether the rates of transfer and renewal diﬀered by the type
of patentees. The evidenced revealed that small innovators and private inventors are the most
active sellers of patents while government agencies and large innovators are the least. Secondly,
we studied the variation of the rates of transfer and renewal across technology ﬁelds and exam-
ined the relative importance of the smaller type of patentees versus their larger counterparts for
each technology ﬁeld. We found some diﬀerences in the aggregate rates of transfer and renewal
across technology ﬁelds. However, the diﬀerences were much larger when we looked at the
relative importance of the smaller type of patentees versus the larger ones. For instance, in the
computer and communications ﬁeld, small innovators transfer 23.9% of their patents while large
innovators only sell 7.9%; however, in the chemical ﬁeld, the sales rates are 17.2% and 12.5% for
small and large innovators respectively. We think this fact can help us learn something about
where the beneﬁts of specialization may be more important. Third, we analyzed the impact of
patent characteristics on the rates of transfer and renewal. We showed that the probability of
a patent being traded and the probability of a patent being allowed to expire depended on a
20number of factors—the age of the patent, the number of citations received by a given age, the
patent generality, and whether the patent had been previously traded or not. We found that
younger, frequently cited, more original, and recently traded patents were more likely to be
traded and renewed. Finally, we interpreted this evidence using a model of patent transfers
and renewal in a context with the arrival of opportunities for surplus-enhancing transfer (i.e.,
gains from trade) and costs of technology adoption.
The new data can also open new avenues for research. One example would be to estimate
the gains from trade in the market for patents and quantify the costs of technology adoption
(Serrano [46]). Another example could be to analyze to what extent the move towards higher
protection of intellectual property rights, which occurred in the mid 1980s, facilitated trade
in patents. An interesting extension to our data work would be to standarize the names of
buyers and seller of patents and link them to the characteristics of their ﬁrms. This extension
would permit us to study whether patent property rights tend to be transferred at the local
level (like spillovers do), to explore whether patents are acquired by ﬁrms with complementary
innovations, and to examine whether small ﬁrms specialize in the creation of knowledge and
then sell their patents to their larger counterparts. We leave these topics for future research.
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24Table A-1: Summary Statistics of the Number of Patents Traded and Untraded over their Life
Cycle
Individually Owned Corporations Govt. Agen.
Unassigned Priv. Inventors Small Medium Large
Total 304,087 17,654 453,683 567,081 565,582 25,383
Traded 28,044 2,185 54,533 53,359 31,540 809
Not traded 276,043 15,469 399,150 513,722 534,042 24,574
Table A-2: Estimates of the Logit Regressions of the Decision to Trade or Allow a Patent to
Expire Conditional on the Number of Patent Citations Received
Individually Owned Corporations (Innovators) Govt. agen. All All#
All Unassigned Priv. inv. All Small Medium Large
A. Trading Decision
total_citations 0.0163 0.0162 0.0174 0.00537 0.0109 0.00491 -0.00250 0.00432 0.00703 0.00744
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0025) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0060) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Obs 1969075 1856048 113027 10732311 3064018 3948742 3719551 175070 12876456 12876456
B. Expiration Decision
total_citations -0.0406 -0.0406 -0.0394 -0.0522 -0.0834 -0.0572 -0.0480 -0.0529 -0.0532 -0.0499
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0032) (0.0004) (0.0087) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0027) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Obs 373918 352559 21359 1911564 559918 712799 638847 35882 2321364 2321364
Note: all regressions include age and technology ﬁeld dummies. # The estimates of last column also include type of patentee dummies.
*Not statiscally signiﬁcant at the 1% level, **Not statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, ***Not statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Table A-3: Estimates of the Logit Regressions of the Decision to Allow a Patent to Expire or
Being Traded Conditional on Patent Generality
Individually owned Corporations (Innovators) Govt. agen. All All#
All Unassigned Priv. inv. All Small Medium Large
A. Trading Decision
generality 0.2109 0.2092 0.2051 0.2146 0.1975 0.1749 0.2125 -0.0928*** 0.2119 0.2028
(0.0162) (0.0168) (0.0602) (0.00779) (0.0122) (0.0127) (0.0169) (0.1020) (0.0070) (0.0070)
Obs 1969075 1856048 113027 10732311 3064018 3948742 3719551 175070 12876456 12876456
Used 1717383 1617743 99640 9527208 2707508 3485280 3334430 150170 11395526 11395526
B. Expiration Decision
generality -0.0958 -0.0940 -0.1110 -0.1666 -0.1407 -0.2012 -0.1670 -0.1224 -0.1681 -0.1560
(0.0108) (0.0111) (0.0465) (0.00597) (0.0101) (0.00980) (0.0114) (0.0352) (0.0051) (0.0052)
Obs 373918 352559 21359 1911564 559918 712799 638847 35882 2321364 2321364
Used 331408 312327 19081 1721853 501791 637128 582934 31232 2084493 2084493
Note: all regressions include age and technology ﬁeld dummies. # The estimates of last column also include type of patentee dummies.
*Not statiscally signiﬁcant at the 1% level, **Not statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, ***Not statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
25Table A-4: Estimates of the Logit Regressions of the Decision to Trade and Expire a Patent
for Previously Traded Patents
Individual Owners Corporations (Innovators) Govt. agen. All All#
All Unassigned Priv. inv. All Small Medium Large
A. Trading Decision
Previouslytraded 1.0926 1.1052 0.8894 0.9976 0.8425 0.8793 1.1451 0.8631 1.0317 0.9428
(0.0156) (0.0163) (0.0570) (0.00775) (0.0116) (0.0130) (0.0178) (0.1533) (0.00692) (0.00697)
Obs 1647334 1551961 95373 9145965 2610335 3381661 3153969 149687 10942986 10942986
B. Expiration Decision
Previouslytraded -0.8723 -0.8730 -0.8355 -0.1663 -0.3341 -0.1060 -0.1762 -1.0472 -0.3155 -0.3554
(0.0128) (0.0133) (0.0492) (0.00649) (0.0102) (0.0104) (0.0148) (0.0751) (0.00576) (0.00589)
Obs 373918 352559 21359 1911564 559918 712799 638847 35882 2321364 2321364
Note: all regressions include age and technology ﬁeld dummies. # The estimates of last column also include type of patentee dummies.
*Not statiscally signiﬁcant at the 1% level, **Not statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, ***Not statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Table A-5: Estimates of the Logit Regressions of the Decision to Trade and let a Patent Expire
Conditioning on the Number of Years Since the Last Transfer
Individual Owners Corporations (Innovators) Govt. agen. All All#
All Unassigned Priv. inv. All Small Medium Large
A. Trading decision
tradedyearsago1 -0.1929 -0.2014 0.0788*** -0.1091 -0.0964 -0.1639 -0.028*** 0.5869* -0.1235 -0.1293
(0.0177) (0.0183) (0.0715) (0.0092) (0.0136) (0.0150) (0.0232) (0.2830) (0.0081) (0.0081)
tradedyearsago^2 0.00939 0.0100 0.0004*** 0.0046 0.0046 0.0101 -0.0079 -0.0728* 0.0055 0.0058
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0068) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0023) (0.0293) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Obs 1647334 1551961 95373 9145965 2610335 3381661 3153969 149687 10942986 10942986
Used 156274 144592 11682 672783 271308 260889 140586 4213 833270 833270
B. Expiration decision
tradedyearsago 0.4047 0.4141 0.2999 0.3594 0.3192 0.3565 0.4298 0.4984 0.370 0.3656
(0.0189) (0.0196) (0.0694) (0.0089) (0.0139) (0.0143) (0.0202) (0.1130) (0.0080) (0.0080)
tradedyearsago^2 -0.0231 -0.0237 -0.0151 -0.0223 -0.0204 -0.0210 -0.0279 -0.0374* -0.0226 -0.0225
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0053) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0094) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Obs 373918 352559 21359 1911564 559918 712799 638847 35882 2321364 2321364
Used 39844 36906 2938 171754 69986 66495 35273 1107 212705 212705
Note: all regressions include age and technology ﬁeld dummies. # The estimates of last column also include type of patentee dummies.
*Not statiscally signiﬁcant at the 1% level, **Not statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, ***Not statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level,
and ****The valididty ofthe model ﬁt is questinable.
26Table A-6: Estimates of the Logit Regressions of the Decision to Sell and Expire a Patent
Conditional on its Age by Type of Patentees (With Patent Category Dummies)
Individually Owned Corporations (Innovators) Govt. age.**** All All#
All Unassigned Priv. inv.**** All Small Medium Large
A. Trading decision with age
intercept -4.9988 -4.9320 - -4.7036 -4.8248 -4.6152 -4.9348 - -4.7716 -6.0797
(0.1395) (0.1395) - (0.0476) (0.0897) (0.0698) (0.0958) - (0.0450) (0.0566)
age_year1 1.2533 1.635 - 0.7617 1.0819 0.6687 0.3968 - 0.8584 0.8381
(0.1397) (0.1397) - (0.0477) (0.0899) (0.0699) (0.0955) - (0.0451) (0.0451)
age_year2 0.8623 0.7733 - 0.7305 1.0121 0.6219 0.4689 - 0.7475 ) 0.7253
(0.1399) (0.1400) - (0.0478) (0.0900) (0.0700) (0.0956) - (0.0452 (0.0452)
age_year3 0.6869 0.6024 - 0.6932 0.9541 0.5490 0.5276 - 0.6835 0.6592
(0.1401) (0.1402) - (0.0479) (0.0901) (0.0701) (0.0956) - (0.0452) (0.0452)
age_year4 0.6743 0.5853 - 0.6883 0.9461 0.5157 0.5640 - 0.6780 0.6516
(0.1401) (0.1403) - (0.0479) (0.0902) (0.0702) (0.0957) - (0.0453) (0.0453)
age_year5 0.8324 0.7432 - 0.6964 0.9655 0.4808 0.6529 - 0.7110 0.6948
(0.1405) (0.1407) - (0.0481) (0.0904) (0.0706) (0.0959) - (0.0454) (0.0454)
age_year6 0.6365 0.5527 - 0.5967 0.8694 0.3866 0.5342 - 0.5986 ) 0.5820
(0.1409) (0.1411) - (0.0482) (0.0906) (0.0709) (0.0963) - (0.0456 (0.0456)
age_year7 0.5572 0.4704 - 0.5640 0.8118 0.3309 0.5726 - 0.5554 0.5382
(0.1412) (0.1414) - (0.0484) (0.0908) (0.0711) (0.0965) - (0.0457) (0.0457)
age_year8 0.6073 0.5240 - 0.5437 0.8038 0.2667 0.5939 - 0.5443 0.5274
(0.1413) (0.1415) - (0.0485) (0.0910) (0.0715) (0.0966) - (0.0458) (0.0458)
age_year9 0.7953 0.7104 - 0.6085 0.8299 0.3280 0.7427 - 0.6326 0.6228
(0.1425) (0.1428) - (0.0490) (0.0918) (0.0724) (0.0972) - (0.0462) (0.0462)
age_year10 0.6839 0.5940 - 0.5882 0.7445 0.4077 0.6719 - 0.5988 0.5876
(0.1433) (0.1437) - (0.0492) (0.0923) (0.0725) (0.0979) - (0.0465) (0.0465)
age_year11 0.6507 0.5530 - 0.5373 0.6851 0.3174 0.6833 - 0.5517 0.5396
(0.1440) (0.1445) - (0.0496) (0.0929) (0.0733) (0.0984) - (0.0468) (0.0468)
age_year12 0.5872 0.5214 - 0.4646 0.5993 0.2551 0.6132 - 0.4808 0.4688
(0.1451) (0.1455) - (0.0502) (0.0939) (0.0743) (0.0993) - (0.0473) (0.0473)
age_year13 0.8100 0.7280 - 0.5679 0.6845 0.4620 0.6003 - 0.5983 0.5914
(0.1489) (0.1497) - (0.0517) (0.0965) (0.0763) (0.1028) - (0.0487) (0.0488)
age_year14 0.6749 0.6166 - 0.5220 0.6916 0.2805 0.6811 - 0.5408 0.5326
(0.1529) (0.1538) - (0.0530) (0.0982) (0.0796) (0.1042) - (0.0500) (0.0500)
age_year15 0.5742 0.4934 - 0.3306 0.4812 0.1986* 0.3688 - 0.3629 0.3577
(0.1578) (0.1593) - (0.0556) (0.1027) (0.0830) (0.1104) - (0.0523) (0.0524)
age_year16 0.2423*** 0.1982*** - 0.3156 0.3192 0.1556** 0.5532 - 0.3123 0.3075
(0.1730) (0.1743) - (0.0584) (0.1098) (0.0878) (0.1125) - (0.0552) (0.0553)
Obs 1969075 1856048 113027 10732311 3064018 3948742 3719551 175070 12876456 12876456
B. Expiring decision
intercept -0.1314 -0.1270 -0.2172 -0.5601 -0.5771 -0.6523 -0.7339 0.2372 -0.3483 0.3312
(0.0117) (0.0121) (0.0484) (0.00582) (0.00954) (0.00961) (0.0140) (0.0506) (0.00495) (0.0124)
age_year5 -0.4045 -0.3964 -0.5712 -1.1014 -0.7795 -1.1854 -1.4110 -1.2431 -0.8935 -0.9873
(0.0118) (0.0121) (0.0482) (0.00517) (0.00933) (0.00841) (0.00948) (0.0405) (0.00461) (0.00470)
age_year9 -0.0199*** -0.0198*** -0.0305*** -0.3157 -0.1802 -0.3428 -0.4216 0.1537 -0.2366 -0.2785
(0.0125) (0.0129) (0.0509) (0.00522) (0.00969) (0.00842) (0.00922) (0.0415) (0.00476) (0.00483)
Obs 373918 352559 21359 1911564 559918 712799 638847 35882 2321364 2321364
Note: all regressions include age and technology ﬁeld dummies. # The estimates of last column also include type of patentee dummies.
*Not statiscally signiﬁcant at the 1% level, **Not statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *** Not statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%
level, ****The valididty of the model ﬁt is questinable.
27